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Abstract 
The COVID-19 pandemic has led policy makers to expand traditional public health surveillance to 
take advantage of new technologies, such as tracking apps, to control the spread of SARS-CoV-2. This 
article explores the human rights dimensions of how these new surveillance technologies are being 
used and assesses the extent to which they entail legitimate restrictions to a range of human rights, 
including the rights to health, life, and privacy. We argue that human rights offer a crucial framework 
for protecting the public from regulatory overreach by ensuring that digital health surveillance does not 
undermine fundamental features of democratic society. First, we describe the surveillance technologies 
being used to address COVID-19 and reposition these technologies within the evolution of public 
health surveillance tools and the emergence of discussions concerning the compatibility of such tools 
with human rights. We then evaluate the potential human rights implications of the surveillance tools 
being used today by analyzing the extent to which they pass the tests of necessity and proportionality 
enshrined in international human rights law. We conclude by recommending ways in which the harmful 
human rights effects associated with these technologies might be reduced and public trust in their use 
enhanced.
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Introduction 
The COVID-19 public health crisis is the first truly 
global infectious disease threat in over a centu-
ry. The scale of the pandemic has deepened the 
imperative for policy makers to expand beyond tra-
ditional public health mechanisms of surveillance 
to use new technologies, including global position-
ing systems, cell phone apps, and facial recognition 
to control the spread of SARS-CoV-2. These new 
surveillance technologies highlight longstanding 
tensions in public health between individual rights 
and collective interests. They also fall at the interface 
of multiple contemporary trends: the reduction of 
privacy online, the private monetization of online 
data, the use of big data in policymaking, and the 
abuse of online surveillance by governments. These 
trends are viewed as creating “surveillance states” 
and new forms of “surveillance capitalism” with the 
capacity to erode human rights and undermine de-
mocracy.1 This context is important when it comes 
to digital public health surveillance mechanisms 
for COVID-19, since historical and contemporary 
rights abuses of surveillance mechanisms erode 
public trust and the solidarity necessary for the 
widespread adoption and public health efficacy of 
such mechanisms. 
Human rights standards have evolved to en-
sure that public health surveillance mechanisms, 
even in the context of a public health emergency, 
meet human rights standards of legality, necessity, 
and proportionality. These standards require that 
adequate safeguards be put in place to ensure that 
such surveillance mechanisms, whether they are 
digital or traditional, do not illegitimately restrict 
the human rights to health, life, or privacy, and 
are not abused for the purposes of state control. In 
this light, the increased use of blanket enforcement 
measures, such as mass-scale video surveillance, 
drones, facial recognition, and even large-scale 
attempts at data mining, raise significant human 
rights concerns. 
In this article, we explore the human rights di-
mensions of how these new technologies are being 
used to address the COVID-19 pandemic, and in 
particular, the extent to which they are legitimate 
restrictions on a range of human rights, including 
the right to privacy, the right to health, and other 
social and economic rights. We argue that human 
rights serve two important functions in the context 
of public health surveillance: first, by offering an 
important framework for safeguarding the public 
from overreach, and second, by enhancing the ef-
ficacy of the mechanisms themselves to the extent 
that their use in democratic constitutional contexts 
relies on widescale consensual public opt-in. We 
begin with mapping the surveillance technologies 
being used in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis, 
before analyzing the evolution and potential hu-
man rights implications of these tools. In doing 
so, we analyze the extent to which surveillance 
tools meet necessity and proportionality criteria in 
international human rights law. At the same time, 
we acknowledge the functional limitations of this 
assessment—international human rights law pri-
marily binds states that ratify its instruments, yet it 
is often private corporate actors who create and use 
these tools. We discuss to what extent this balanc-
ing of human rights and public health imperatives 
extends to such nonstate actors. We close with rec-
ommendations to mitigate the human rights effects 
of these technologies and increase public trust in 
their use.
Public health surveillance during 
COVID-19 
Public health surveillance is the systematic collec-
tion, storage, usage, and dissemination of personal 
information to identify an outbreak and mitigate 
the spread of disease.2 In light of the global spread 
of COVID-19, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) has stated that the main objectives of sur-
veillance during this pandemic are 
to enable rapid detection, isolation, testing, 
and management of cases, to monitor trends in 
COVID-19 deaths, to identify, follow-up and 
quarantine of contacts, to detect and contain 
clusters and outbreaks, … monitor longer term 
epidemiologic trends and evolution of SARS-CoV-2 
virus.3 
In further guidance on public health surveillance 
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during the COVID-19 crisis, WHO has also argued 
that digital technologies may support rapid report-
ing, contact tracing, and data management.4 The 
use of digital tools in public health surveillance is 
not unique to the COVID-19 crisis. During the out-
break of severe acute respiratory syndrome in 2003, 
Hong Kong identified clusters of disease using elec-
tronic data systems.5 During the Ebola outbreaks in 
West Africa in 2014–2016, mobile phone data were 
also used to model travel patterns and increase the 
viability of contact tracing.6 
The current COVID-19 crisis has come at a 
time of digital revolution, with huge growth in mo-
bile phone and social media use, and sophisticated 
technologies that can support widespread public 
health surveillance.7 Digital surveillance tools can 
far more easily enable governments to identify dis-
ease outbreaks and engage in case identification.8 
Outbreak surveillance 
Digital surveillance tools have revolutionized the 
way in which public health systems can identify 
and respond to outbreaks. Tools such as WHO’s 
Go.Data use real time data to register cases and 
their contacts, facilitating the analysis of contact 
tracing data and chains of transmission to better 
understand epidemics.9 Tools are often run by 
third parties, such as technology companies and 
research institutes, which then have the capacity to 
mine data through machine learning and crowd-
sourcing.10 For instance, the private Toronto-based 
corporation Blue Dot reported the emergence 
of COVID-19 through its early detection system 
before WHO declared a pandemic.11 This was ac-
complished through the use of big data, which used 
natural language processing and machine learning 
to cull data from hundreds of thousands of sources, 
including statements from official public health 
organizations, digital media, global airline ticket-
ing data, livestock health reports, and population 
demographics.12
While these new innovative systems can 
provide quick and often informative data, they 
can also suffer from problems of accuracy due to 
sample bias, over-interpretation of findings, and 
fragmentation among competing systems that lack 
a centralized approach to data collection.13
Case identification 
Early and rapid case identification is crucial during 
a pandemic for the isolation of cases and tracing of 
contacts in order to reduce disease transmission.14 
Digital technologies can supplement clinical and 
laboratory notification through the automated use 
of symptom-based case identification, accelerating 
reporting to public health databases.15 During the 
COVID-19 crisis, digital tools for case identification 
have been used through online symptom reporting 
apps in numerous countries, such as Singapore, 
Malaysia, the UK, and South Africa. Such tools can 
easily be integrated within national databases.16
During this crisis, we are also seeing the 
increasing use of wearable technologies, such as 
bracelets, which enable public health authorities to 
check people’s temperatures and other symptoms 
in order to ascertain whether they may be expe-
riencing COVID-19 symptoms. Liechtenstein, for 
example, plans to roll out such bracelets to the entire 
population.17 Sensors, including thermal imaging 
cameras and infrared sensors, are being deployed 
within public spaces in Taiwan and Singapore 
(and by private companies in the United States and 
Canada) to identify potential cases on the basis of 
symptoms such as temperature.18 Several airports, 
bus shelters, and train stations have installed these 
technologies, although there are concerns about 
the number of false positives that these schemes 
could generate.19
The tracing of contacts, which is designed to 
reduce onward transmission, is part of the case 
identification strategy. Previously, states relied pri-
marily on manual contact tracing—interviewing an 
infected person, tracking down the recent contacts 
that they could recall, and advising those people to 
self-isolate. However, given the high proportion of 
pre-symptomatic transmission for COVID-19 and 
the scale of national and global infections, it was 
argued that manual contact tracing would be too 
slow to stop the progression of infection through 
the population.20 This led to the development of 
digital tools to support faster contact tracing, pri-
marily through the use of mobile smartphones or 
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other wearable devices with geolocation capability. 
Mobile phone contact tracing apps can thus make 
contact tracing and notification instantaneous, 
since, by keeping a record of proximity events be-
tween individuals, it can immediately alert recent 
close contacts of diagnosed cases and prompt them 
to self-isolate.21
Human rights concerns raised by evolving 
surveillance technologies 
During pandemics, public health surveillance is 
considered critical for averting and containing the 
spread of a disease. However, these public health 
data are often personally identifiable and sensitive 
and may reveal details about a person’s lifestyle, 
behaviors, and health.22 Thus, the evolution of such 
surveillance technologies has always been accom-
panied by rights-based concerns about how the 
data are used.
Discrimination against vulnerable and mar-
ginalized populations was entrenched by early 
surveillance efforts. For instance, nationalist gov-
ernments employed public health surveillance to 
legitimize discriminatory public health policies 
against migrants during the Industrial Revolution. 
The rapid spread of diseases in urban centers was 
often attributed to racial minorities, whether Roma 
populations in Europe or Chinese immigrants in 
the United States.23 For instance, the rapid spread 
of smallpox in San Francisco in 1876 was falsely 
attributed to Chinese Americans living in the city, 
leading to quarantine orders on the basis of race. 
Public health officials produced reports that blamed 
the outbreak on the refusal of Chinese Americans 
to assimilate into Western society, highlighting 
their deviance from white society to further stig-
matization and justify discrimination.24 Following 
from the genocidal horrors of World War II, with 
Nazi eugenics laws massively violating the rights of 
minority populations under the purported public 
health justification of “healing the state,” countries 
came together under the postwar United Nations 
(UN) to codify protections of individual rights.
Nondiscrimination and equality would be-
come core elements of international human rights 
law. Article 2 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) states that every human 
being is entitled to all rights and freedoms “with-
out distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status.” Similarly, the 1966 International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) require state parties to 
guarantee the enjoyment of all rights without dis-
crimination of any kind. 
These human rights developments would also 
look to protect individual privacy, first in the UDHR 
and culminating in the ICCPR.25 The ICCPR creat-
ed a legal imperative for states to ensure that no one 
is “subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference 
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, 
nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and repu-
tation.”26 In developing these ICCPR provisions, 
states debated the conditions under which it would 
be acceptable when facing a national crisis (such 
as a public health emergency) to limit or suspend 
individual rights and freedoms—such as the right 
to privacy—seeking to balance the responsibility to 
protect their citizens and the imperative to uphold 
civil and political liberties.27 
UN member states came to recognize that 
“public health may be invoked as a ground for 
limiting certain rights.”28 Through the Siracusa 
Principles, a nonbinding document developed by 
nongovernmental organizations and adopted by the 
UN Economic and Social Council in 1984, scholars 
developed a set of principles to ensure that any lim-
itations on civil and political rights occur only “in 
narrowly defined circumstances,” holding that such 
human rights infringements may be made only un-
der the following conditions: (1) when applied as a 
last resort; (2) when prescribed by law (that is, not 
imposed arbitrarily); (3) when related to a compel-
ling public interest (for example, the protection of 
public health); and (4) when found to be necessary, 
proportional to the public interest, and without less 
intrusive or restrictive measures available.29
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The Siracusa Principles have become central 
to understandings of human rights derogation in 
the field of “health and human rights” and critical 
to understanding how human rights law should 
align with global health governance pursuant to 
the International Health Regulations. Developed by 
states as an international legal framework to address 
public health emergencies, the International Health 
Regulations’ purpose is to prevent, protect against, 
control, and facilitate public health responses to 
the international spread of disease, and they make 
surveillance central to guiding effective public 
health action against cross-border disease threats.30 
Balancing the societal benefit of public health sur-
veillance against the state infringement of individual 
rights, the revised International Health Regulations 
(2005) for the first time incorporated human rights 
into infectious disease control, focusing on human 
rights considerations in disease surveillance. The 
regulations structure state responses to public health 
emergencies of international concern in ways that are 
commensurate with, and restricted to, public health 
risks and which avoid unnecessary interference with 
international traffic, trade, and human rights.
Concerns raised by digital health 
surveillance during COVID-19 
The scale and complexity of digital health surveil-
lance raises four main concerns for human rights, 
and these human rights concerns risk undermin-
ing the public health surveillance system due to the 
erosion of public trust.
First, the efficacy of digital tools for global 
health surveillance is questionable, since many of 
these tools are still in the experimental phase.31 For 
instance, at least 40 countries are using contact 
tracing apps, but there is not yet sufficient evidence 
about their ability to mitigate the spread of disease.32
Second, the fact that third-party actors are 
creating, using, and storing data poses questions 
of accountability. While traditional public health 
surveillance involved primarily the state, the rise 
of emerging digital surveillance tools has led to the 
involvement of a large number of third-party pri-
vate actors that have access to personal health data 
that could be exploited in ways that irreparably 
damage trust in public heath surveillance.33 In the 
UK, for instance, private companies Serco, SITEL, 
and Amazon Web Services will all have access to 
users’ data, and these data will reportedly be held 
for 20 years. It is currently unclear whether these 
companies will be allowed to privately benefit from 
the use of these data.34
Third, beyond threats to the general public, in-
creased digital health surveillance may exacerbate 
specific harms to minority groups such as LGBTQ 
people and migrants. This may be in the form of 
increased violations to their rights of privacy, in-
creased discrimination, and the reinforcement of 
inequalities. While aggregated location data can 
monitor population flows in real time, identify 
potential transmission hotspots, and give insight 
into the effectiveness of other public health in-
terventions, such as travel restrictions, it can also 
harm vulnerable users by identifying their physical 
locations. This is extremely concerning given that 
a recent analysis of 50 COVID-19-related apps in 
the Google store showed that only 16 explicitly 
stated in their policies their intent to anonymize 
user data.35 Minority groups are particularly at risk 
of abuse of privacy; for instance, contact tracing 
for a COVID-19 outbreak in South Korea led to 
homophobic abuse targeted at the South Korean 
LGBTQ community.36 There are already reports 
that some minority groups have been dispropor-
tionately affected by COVID-19 and, in many 
places, are already less likely to seek health care due 
to a history of discrimination.37 
Making private and public service provision 
contingent on downloading digital surveillance 
tools (such as contact tracing apps) could not only 
constitute a threat to personal autonomy but also 
be discriminatory toward already disadvantaged 
groups. For instance, employers may demand that 
staff download apps before being allowed into work, 
people may need these apps in order to use public 
services (such as health services), and landlords 
could demand that people download apps before 
being able to rent a property. These examples are 
all problematic, not just because they are coercive 
but also because they reinforce inequality, often ex-
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cluding poor and vulnerable groups of people, such 
as migrants who may not be able to access or use 
the apps. In India, for instance, the contact tracing 
app Aarogya Setu has now become mandatory for 
all employees, rendering the concept of meaning-
ful consent irrelevant.38 In Singapore, employers 
are told to encourage all workers to download the 
TraceTogether app, but it is mandatory for certain 
groups of migrant workers, making them particu-
larly vulnerable as they often have fewer rights than 
other citizens.39 Many migrants in these countries, 
especially those employed in the informal sector, 
are often poor and on precarious contracts. Man-
datory requirements to download and use such 
apps would mean that they have to buy newer mod-
els of smartphones which are expensive. The use of 
digital surveillance tools could also disproportion-
ately affect some groups, such as those with lower 
socioeconomic status and those who are older and 
who may not have adequate internet access.40 For 
instance, the Qatari contact tracing app EHTER-
AZ is another example of a mandatory app that 
requires users to have compatible smartphones, 
which is problematic when many citizens and mi-
grant workers live in poverty. In Qatar, people who 
fail to download the app could face up to three years 
in prison and a fine of QR200,000 (US$55,000). 
Such impositions disproportionately affect the 88% 
migrant population in Qatar, exacerbating existing 
social inequalities.
Fourth, the use of digital health surveillance 
measures may lead to abuses by states and nonstate 
party actors if such measures become embedded 
in other processes different from their original 
purposes. The long-term nature of the COVID-19 
crisis has led to fears that a new extended regime 
of health surveillance could entail permanent, 
intrusive surveillance, lasting well beyond the 
“temporary” measures justified by an “emergen-
cy” context.41 Digital surveillance apps could be 
linked to comprehensive medical records and used 
to enable health care access. In Hangzhou, China, 
authorities have reportedly started to link data 
from surveillance apps to citizens’ medical records. 
There are also reports that authorities in Shanghai 
are considering integrating a personal health index 
into an app, which will rank citizens on indicators 
such as how much they sleep, how many daily steps 
they take, and how much they smoke and drink.42 
These extensions lead to concerns that the ability 
to access public services could be tied to the app, 
thereby making it easier to deny health care and 
other essential services to members of the public.43 
Furthermore, the commercialization of health data 
drawn from long-term surveillance could also lead 
to discriminatory exclusions and differential pric-
ing by insurance companies. 
Digital tools could also be securitized in a way 
that exceeds legitimate public health objectives. 
Some data from public health surveillance tools 
have already been shared with security officials. The 
governments of Israel, Kenya, Mexico, and Turkey, 
among others, have reportedly used the COVID-19 
pandemic as an opportunity to analyze telecommu-
nications data under the guise of “contact tracing.”44 
The Pakistani government has repurposed an an-
ti-terrorism system designed by the country’s spy 
agency to trace suspected COVID-19 cases.45 There 
are dangers that some of these surveillance mech-
anisms will become structurally embedded as they 
did in the US War on Terror—a modern example of 
how emergency measures may be abused to become 
permanent fixtures within societies.46
Finally, abuses due to the misuse of data, 
privacy violations, and discrimination due to the 
uneven coverage and consequences of digital health 
surveillance measures might not only damage 
public trust in public health surveillance but also 
lead to fragmented responses caused by competing 
actors promoting different digital tools
Human rights obligations and digital 
surveillance 
Under international human rights law, states are 
required to have robust public health surveillance 
measures in order to safeguard the rights to life and 
health.47 In the case of COVID-19, these obligations 
are critical, as surveillance is necessary to break 
chains of transmission and learn as much as pos-
sible in order to be able to develop better medical 
interventions, drugs, and vaccines. 
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As discussed above, digital surveillance can 
threaten the right to privacy, as enshrined in in-
ternational human rights law, beginning in article 
12 of the UDHR and confirmed in article 17 of the 
ICCPR.48 Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights also protects privacy.49 The right to 
privacy has been interpreted as covering the compi-
lation, storage, use, processing, and dissemination 
of data relating to private life.50 Any restrictions to 
the right to privacy should be legal and non-arbi-
trary; necessary and proportionate; and compliant 
with other rights guaranteed in these human rights 
instruments.51 The European Court of Human 
Rights has held that the mere storing of data relating 
to the private life of an individual would constitute 
a violation of the right to privacy; it does not matter 
whether the information is sensitive.52 The Siracusa 
Principles recognize that public health may be in-
voked as a ground for limiting certain rights (such 
as privacy) in order to allow a state to deal with a 
serious threat to the health of the population or in-
dividual people. Human rights derogations under 
the Siracusa Principles would need to meet three 
criteria: legality, necessity, and proportionality.53 
We will explore how the problems posed by digital 
tools stack up against these criteria below. 
Legality 
All restrictions to privacy must be non-arbitrary 
and prescribed by law.54 The UN Human Rights 
Committee, which is mandated with monitoring 
and implementing the ICCPR, has argued that in 
order for law to be non-arbitrary, any interference 
provided for by the law should be in accordance 
with the aims and objectives of the ICCPR and rea-
sonable in the particular circumstances.55 In order 
to comply with legality, personal data must be pro-
cessed in a transparent manner. Transparency is 
important within human rights discourse because 
it enables people to seek meaningful consent, moni-
tor how data are used, and seek redress in instances 
where there are perceived violations of human 
rights.56 Many governments have been accused of 
a lack of transparency. For instance, governments 
need to better explain what apps do, what data they 
collect, where they store the data, and the benefits 
that apps give to the general public. For example, 
the Indian government has been criticized for 
enabling the data collected from its contact trac-
ing app to potentially be used by any government 
agency for other purposes.57 Therefore, states and 
data organizations must be clear about how they 
will use personal data. In Israel, the High Court 
of Justice found that digital surveillance during 
the COVID-19 pandemic, which used national se-
curity legal authority for the Ministry of Health to 
implement the digital tracking of individuals, was 
illegal because it was conducted under an executive 
order and lacked the scrutiny that would have been 
present through legislative approval.58 
Necessity 
In order to limit rights through the use of digital 
technologies, states must show that the limitations 
are “strictly necessary,” in that they must respond 
to a pressing public or social need.59 WHO has 
acknowledged that surveillance measures are nec-
essary to “limit the spread of disease, enable public 
health authorities to manage the risk of COVID-19, 
and thereby enable economic and social activity to 
resume to the extent possible,” as well as to “monitor 
the longer-term trends of COVID-19 transmission 
and the changes in the virus.”60
While there is excellent evidence that digital 
outbreak response tools are more efficient at pro-
viding epidemiological data for disease detection, 
the evidence on whether digital surveillance tools 
for contact tracing are actually effective remains in-
conclusive.61 Some modelling suggests that digital 
health surveillance is necessary because the rate of 
transmission for COVID-19 is so rapid that manu-
al contact tracing would be inadequate, but more 
data are needed to prove the efficacy of the tools.62 
The urgency of alleviating the pandemic does not 
remove the test of necessity, which requires proper 
scientific validity and accuracy.63 
Proportionality 
Under the principle of proportionality, the limita-
tion on human rights must be commensurate to the 
aim. Measures must therefore be timebound and 
purpose-limited to the specific aim of preventing 
s. sekalala, s. dagron, l. forman, and b. m. meier / big data, technology, artificial intelligence, and the 
right to health, 7-20
14
D E C E M B E R  2 0 2 0    V O L U M E  2 2    N U M B E R  2   Health and Human Rights Journal
the spread of infectious diseases. It follows that any 
digital health surveillance that goes beyond public 
health surveillance would fail the proportionality 
test. This view was also taken by the UN General 
Assembly when it considered the indiscriminate 
mass surveillance by the UK and US governments 
in the wake of the September 11 attacks. The subse-
quent UN resolution stated that “surveillance and/
or interception of communications … as well as 
the collection of personal data, in particular when 
carried out on a mass scale, may have [a negative 
effect] on the exercise and enjoyment of human 
rights.”64 The European Court of Human Rights has 
been more expansive on the concept of mass state 
surveillance, holding that legal discretion granted 
to the state to enact surveillance cannot be unfet-
tered.65 In practice, this means that surveillance 
laws must not include blanket provisions, must 
be clear, and can be used only for a legitimate aim 
in order to ensure that the individual is protected 
from arbitrary interference. 
To meet the test of proportionality, data 
should be used only for legitimate public health 
surveillance purposes, such as prevention of disease 
through the tracking and monitoring of patients 
with COVID-19. Determining what amounts to a 
legitimate public health surveillance purpose may 
sometimes be complex. Under the proportionality 
test, data could legitimately be shared across gov-
ernment agencies for health-related purposes or 
used to perform targeted interventions, such as 
reaching out to people who are at risk of getting 
COVID-19, if they have informed consent from 
users. However, it is clear that many digital health 
surveillance tools rely on broad consent, which 
may legally allow data to be used for future pur-
poses. In order for this broad consent to meet the 
requirements of informed consent and maintain 
public trust, the use of future applications should 
still be transparent, and there should be publicly 
accessible mechanisms that can enable participants 
who download health apps to scrutinize the way in 
which their data are being used even after they have 
consented. 
Digital health surveillance data may legally 
be used for enforcement purposes. For instance, 
test and trace data used to enforce quarantines 
and isolations serves a legitimate public purpose. 
Nevertheless, using data for enforcement would be 
considered human rights compliant only if done 
through a process that is transparent, nondiscrim-
inatory, and time limited in order to help local 
authorities identify those at risk. Using criminal 
sanctions for enforcement would only legitimate 
and proportionate if used as a last resort. 
Recommendations 
This article has illustrated that new digital surveil-
lance tools violate a number of human rights, such 
as the rights to privacy, freedom of movement, and 
health, in addition to committing several specific 
rights violations against vulnerable groups, such as 
migrants, LGBTQ populations, and the elderly. For 
digital surveillance tools to comply with human 
rights, they should be evidence based, contribute to 
a comprehensive public health surveillance system, 
include sunset clauses, be nondiscriminatory, and 
ensure mechanisms for greater transparency and 
accountability, including those aimed at nonstate 
actors such as private companies. 
Evidence-based measures 
To meet the criterion of necessity, states should 
insist on conducting rigorous pilot studies and risk 
assessments to ensure accurate, evidence-based 
decision-making.66 Additionally, states should 
take advantage of national and regional evidence 
frameworks for digital health technologies.67 WHO 
and regional bodies, such as the European Union, 
have started to give technical guidance about dig-
ital surveillance tools, but so far they have focused 
primarily on contact tracing apps; moving forward, 
they should also consider the wide range of addi-
tional digital surveillance tools that states may be 
using to monitor and control people.68 
Additionally, a greater reliance on evi-
dence would compel states to show that they 
cannot achieve the goal of preventing the spread 
of COVID-19 through “less restrictive means,” in-
cluding decentralized data within contact tracing 
apps or nontechnological measures. Some govern-
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ments are using centralized approaches for contact 
tracing, in which data are stored on a central server 
managed by the authority that carries out the 
processing of the data. Under this model, once an 
individual comes into contact with an infected 
person, the state is notified and has the power to 
enforce quarantines and sanctions. Taiwan, for 
example, uses smartphone location tracking to de-
tect and sanction quarantine violations.69 However, 
other governments are opting for a decentralized 
approach in which most data are stored locally on 
an individual’s phone, with the user having more 
control over how their data are shared with au-
thorities.70 Apple and Google are partnering with 
countries to promote the adoption of such a decen-
tralized approach.71 
Integrated public health surveillance measures 
Digital technologies for surveillance must be 
integrated into the public health surveillance 
ecosystem. For instance, digital tools that offer 
symptom tracking or contact tracing must be 
followed by rapid testing, isolation or quarantine, 
treatment, and follow-up where necessary.72 South 
Korea and Singapore have successfully introduced 
contact tracing apps to support large teams of 
manual contact tracers as one of many measures, 
including strict isolation of cases and quarantine.73
Temporality 
States must ensure that digital health surveillance 
does not become a new norm. Given the risks to 
privacy, states must include a sunset clause to any 
laws that allow digital public health surveillance, 
which agrees ahead of time what data they are col-
lecting, how long they should collect the data for, 
and when the permission to collect this data will 
expire. For instance, some states, such as Macedo-
nia, have allowed users the power to delete all of 
their data after 14 days. Others, such as Australia, 
have made a provision for contact data stored on 
a device to be automatically deleted after 21 days.74 
Nondiscrimination 
To meet the criteria for legality, necessity, and 
proportionality, digital technologies must not be 
discriminatory. Digital health technologies can 
very easily collect large amounts of data about en-
tire populations, with identifying markers such as 
race, ethnicity, gender, and sexual identity. Wrong-
ly used, these data can lead to the stigmatization of 
already excluded minority or marginalized groups. 
Therefore, states have a human rights obligation to 
ensure that data from digital technologies are not 
misused at the expense of such groups. 
Although there is an increasingly widespread 
use of digital technology, there is still unequal cov-
erage, which may exclude vulnerable groups such 
as those who are poor or older people whose phones 
may not have the technology to support certain 
digital technology functions such as proximity 
tracing.75 Thus, states should ensure that in opting 
for digital technologies, they are not excluding 
large parts of the population as this could affect 
access to health care services and heighten health 
inequalities. 
Transparency and accountability 
States relying on public health surveillance need to 
ensure that their digital public health surveillance 
follows a rights-based approach to transparency and 
accountability mechanisms. This would involve in-
creased participation from a diversity of end users 
in the design and rollout of apps, independent over-
sight through civil society organizations, increased 
research into the human rights effects of these apps, 
and greater accountability for the holders of data, 
including third parties. For instance, in Italy, all 
of the data from public health surveillance tools is 
controlled by the Ministry of Health, and the gov-
ernment has committed to ensuring that data are 
not resold or used for commercial purposes. Some 
of these data “may be shared to facilitate scientific 
research, but only after its complete anonymisation 
and aggregation.”76 
Greater transparency also enables citizens to 
seek judicial scrutiny and appropriate remedies, 
particularly in the case of human rights violations. 
Transparency through strong multilateral and 
multistakeholder review frameworks is necessary 
to hold governments accountable where the use of 
contact tracing apps fails to meet the requirements 
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of international human rights law. Currently, there 
are some examples of domestic review processes 
that have managed to overturn excessive govern-
ment surveillance during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
In Slovakia, the Constitutional Court declared the 
provisions of a newly amended telecommunica-
tions law passed in haste to be unconstitutional. 
The amendments sought to permit state authorities 
to access telecommunications data for the purposes 
of contact tracing; however, the provisions were 
struck down for being insufficiently clear and for 
lacking safeguards against misuse.77
Accountability for how data are used at the 
national level can be facilitated through formal 
mechanisms, such as national human rights action 
plans, which offer a structured and practical ap-
proach to strengthening the realization of human 
rights through public policy. National human rights 
action plans could focus on the ways in which state 
actors are using digital surveillance tools to estab-
lish whether human rights abuses are taking place. 
The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) is a unique 
process that involves a review of the human rights 
records of all UN member states. As a state-driven 
process under the auspices of the Human Rights 
Council, the UPR provides each state the opportu-
nity to declare what actions it has taken to improve 
the human rights situations in its territory and to 
realize its human rights obligations. This process 
has been recognized as a useful tool for achieving 
greater state compliance with the right to health.78 
The role of civil society actors in both of these pro-
cesses could ensure greater scrutiny of the human 
rights impact of digital health surveillance at the 
national level. 
Lastly, there is an increased need for empirical 
research in this area, especially in areas where data 
may be subject to commercialization or deano-
nymization in the future. 
Human rights obligations of third-party actors
Most digital surveillances involve third-party ac-
tors such as technology firms. Although states are 
the primary duty-holders under international law, 
there has been some consensus that nonstate actors 
such as private corporations “have duties to prevent 
human rights abuses …. where they maintain close 
connections with potential victims or potential 
perpetrators.”79 This broadens the scope of corpo-
rate responsibilities to ensure that firms’ actions do 
not, however inadvertently, contribute to the sys-
tematic denial of human rights.80 In 2011, the UN 
Human Rights Council endorsed a framework—the 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights—
allocating responsibility to corporations for human 
rights violations.81 The Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on business and human rights 
thereafter released a framework in which he argued 
that the state had the duty to protect against human 
rights abuses by third parties, including businesses; 
private actors had the duty to respect human rights; 
and there was a need for more effective remedies. 
The Guiding Principles articulated the idea that cor-
porate responsibility extended to all internationally 
recognized fundamental human rights and that it 
was necessary to distinguish the specific responsi-
bilities of corporations from the responsibilities of 
states.82 The responsibility to respect involves effec-
tively “doing no harm.” This goes beyond a passive 
responsibility and can entail taking positive steps.83 
Discharging the responsibility to respect human 
rights requires that private companies carry out 
due diligence. For companies engaged in digital 
surveillance, this means that, just like states, they 
too need to consider whether digital surveillance 
tools meet the criteria of legality, necessity, and 
proportionality. 
Due to the nonbinding nature of the Guiding 
Principles, the nature and extent of these respon-
sibilities—as well as their consequences on private 
actors—are still contested.84 The complex respon-
sibilities of private companies involved in digital 
surveillance would benefit from specialist guidance 
from the UN human rights system, including hu-
man rights treaty bodies and Special Procedures 
mandate holders such as Special Rapporteurs. 
Conclusion 
Numerous digital tools are currently being used 
by states and private actors for public health sur-
veillance in response to COVID-19. Many of these 
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tools raise human rights concerns about privacy, 
autonomy, and nondiscrimination. To comply with 
human rights law, it is important that digital tools 
pass the tests of legality, necessity, and proportion-
ality for the legitimate restriction of rights. 
For digital surveillance tools to comply with 
human rights, six key considerations should be 
considered. In the absence of compelling evidence 
about the efficacy of digital surveillance tools, states 
should ensure that they are evidence-based and 
focus on the least restrictive measures, such as de-
centralized contact tracing. States must ensure that 
digital surveillance tools are used to complement 
a comprehensive public health surveillance system 
and used in conjunction with measures such as 
testing, tracing, quarantining, and treatment. Any 
regulations to promote digital health surveillance 
should include sunset clauses and ensure that there 
is no discrimination against vulnerable groups. 
Additionally, states should ensure mechanisms for 
greater transparency and accountability, including 
those aimed at preventing nonstate actors such as 
private companies from violating human rights.
There is growing evidence that private com-
panies need to respect human rights obligations by 
carrying out due diligence, which would require 
them to analyze whether digital tools meet the 
requirements of legality, necessity, and proportion-
ality. The increased role of private corporate actors, 
who have less robust obligations than those borne 
by states, is concerning in digital health surveil-
lance, and there is an urgent need for international 
human rights bodies to provide updated guidance 
on how private actors can be held accountable for 
human rights violations. 
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